I. Introduction
The 1980s proved to be a turbulent decade for the U.S. banking and financial system. More than 1,000 of the approximately 1,800 insolvent banks that have been closed, acquired, or received assistance to prevent closure since the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was established in 1933 were declared insolvent during the 1980s. In 1988-89 alone, 427 institutions were closed.
De facto failures, which are defined more broadly to include any regulator-induced cessation of autonomous operations, portray an even gloomier picture. This dramatic increase in the bank failure rate has intensified public criticism of deposit-institution regulators, since bank safety and soundness is a aajor regulatory responsibi1ity.l The recent crisis in the savings and loan (S&L) industry helped the already existing problem to surface, and the public has become more eager to assess and assign blame. This paper seeks to develop an empirical model of regulators' failure decision process. As Kane (1985) states, an accurate bank-failure model should begin by distinguishing between insolvency and failure, which are conceptually distinct events. This paper emphasizes that economic insolvency is a market-determined event and that failure, though conditioned on economic insolvency, is not an automatic consequence.
Failure results from a conscious decision by regulatory authorities to acknowledge and to repair the weakened financial condition of the institution. Even when strong evidence of market-value insolvency exists, authorities may not declare the institution officially insolvent.
Therefore, in a realistic analysis, bank failures need to be modeled within the framework of a regulatory decision-making process.
There is abundant literature on deposit institution failures. Among the empirical studies are Sinkey (1975) , Altman (1977) , Martin (1977) , Avery and Hanweck (1984) , Barth et al. (1985) , , and Gaj ewski (1988) .
With the notable exception of Gajewski, most earlier bank-failure studies neglect the distinction between economic insolvency and failure.
Failure is studied by statistically analyzing the power to predict individual failures from a large number of financial ratios obtained from balance sheets and income statements. Although Gajewski improves on these studies by stressing the distinction between insolvency and failure, he models each as a function of financial ratios only. Most studies have concentrated on relatively small institutions whose stock does not trade publicly. Therefore, the financial ratios used are based on book values rather than market values. In not using stock-market data, accountingbased studies implicitly assume that financial ratios provide an unbiased estimate of market-value insolvency.
To develop a framework for a regulatory decision-making process, it is important to consider principal-agent problems. The theory of public choice applies and extends economic theory to the realm of political or governmental decision-making (Buchanan [1960 , 19671, Tulloch [1965 , Niskanen [1971] , Stigler [1977] , and Buchanan and Tollison [1984] ). Myers and Majluf (1984) , Narayanan (1985) , and Campbell and Marino (1988) apply public choice theory to explain the managerial decision-making of an enterprise. Again, based on public choice theory, Kane (1988 Kane ( , 1989 develops a model of regulatory decision-making. This paper goes beyond previous empirical studies by modeling failure as an outcome of the regulatory decision-making process. Economic insolvency is treated as only one of the several conditioning factors that influence a failure decision. Unlike Gajewski's model, but following Kane's (1988) , the empirical model of the regulator's failure decision developed here explicitly states the economic, political, and bureaucratic constraints and conflicts of interest as factors facing regulators.
Concentrating on publicly traded institutions permits the use of stock-market data in determining economic insolvency.
The following section presents the necessary concepts. Section I11 develops the model, and section IV presents and interprets the empirical results. Finally, section V summarizes and concludes the analysis.
Insolvency vs. Failure: The Incentive Structure of Regulators
This section seeks to clarify the difference between economic insolvency and financial institution failures and to discuss the regulatory incentive structure that fosters this difference.
Official insolvency occurs when an institution's chartering authority judges its capital to be inadequate. However, the procedures by which this decision is made are not clear. To determine a depository institution's level of capital for regulatory purposes, it is helpful to divide its capital into two components: enterprise-contributed equity and federally contributed equity (Kane [1989] ).
As Kane explains, enterprise-contributed equity is the capital of the institution net of the capitalized value of its deposit insurance guarantees. To the extent that federal guarantees are underpriced,. the deposit insurer contributes de facto capital to the institutions.
Federally contributed capital is determined by the amount of risk that insurance agencies are prepared to absorb. These valuable guarantees are actually equity instruments that make the U.S. government a de facto investor in deposit institutions. Unless an appropriate recapitalization rule is imposed on managers and stockholders, the capitalized value of the guarantees increases as the institution's enterprise-contributed equity decreases or as the riskiness of either its portfolio or its environment increases. Clearly, the value of the federally contributed capital should not be counted as a part of the institution's capital for regulatory purposes.
De facto or market-value insolvency exists when an institution can no longer meet its contractual obligations from its own resources. This occurs whenever the market value of the institution's nonownership liabilities exceeds the market value of its assets, or when the market value of its enterprise-contributed equity becomes negative.
Official (de jure) insolvency, or closure (de jure failure) occurs when the market-value insolvency is officially recognized and the firm is closed or involuntarily merged out of existence. De facto failure can be defined more broadly than closure as any regulator-induced cessation of autonomous operations.
Unlike economic insolvency, which is a market-determined event, de jure or de facto failure is an administrative option that the authorities may or may not choose to exercise even when strong evidence of market-value insolvency exists. This distinction between economic insolvency and institutional failure need not exist. By forbearing from enforcing capital requirements, federal officials purposely allow economically insolvent institutions to operate, delaying a failure decision. Forbearance allows the accounting recognition of already existing losses to be deferred and generates the longer-run implicit cost of undermining market discipline against excessive risk-taking. As long as the guarantor allows market-valueinsolvent institutions to operate, additional losses primarily accrue to the insurance agencies, increasing the value of insurance guarantees.
Forbearance policies protect depositors at the cost of preventing or postponing individual bank failures and maintaining inefficient banks.
These policies limit the community's ability to obtain an optimal allocation of resources, and they impose welfare losses on society as a whole (Meltzer [1967] , Pyle [1984] ).
Yet, as Kane (1989) notes, forbearance policies survive because they deliver benefits to politicians and top industry regulators. The economic, political, and bureaucratic constraints federal regulators face in making failure decisions lead them to adopt these policies.
Economic constraints of federal officials are embedded in the budget procedures that restrict the liquidity, staffing, and legal authority of the insurance agency. Budget procedures acknowledge the effects of explicit income and expenditures, but fail to account for the implicit long-run costs of forbearance policies and inefficient insolvencyresolution methods. These budget procedures are imposed on regulators by politicians who find forbearance attractive, rather than facing up to problems would force them to accept some of the blame for allowing the situation to deteriorate so badly.
Political and bureaucratic constraints of federal officials are embedded in career-oriented incentives, whereby officials aim to keep their constituencies and clientele happy. Their explicit salaries are lower than those found in the private sector. Economists conceive this gap to be bridged by implicit wages. Kane (1989) argues that these implicit wages are the nonpecuniary benefits of being in a high government office and the expected future wage increases that accrue in postgovernment employment (often within the regulated industry).
If regulators can successfully complete their term in government service, they can generally expect to see this experience rewarded with higher wages in postgovernment employment. The importance of the perceived quality of their performance makes federal officials very sensitive to the opinions of the institutions they regulate and to their trade associations. This leads regulators to be influenced by their constituencies, avoiding solutions unfavorable to them or promoting solutions that they find particularly desirable. Lobbying activities exaggerate and make the negative early effects of public policies more visible, further slowing the adoption of substantial changes in financial regulation. Regulators cannot make substantial changes without being perceived as causing or aggravating the problems. Adopting a coverup strategy helps top insurance officials to keep politicians at bay and at the same time allows them to avoid bad publicity.
All of these constraints increase the career costs of serving the taxpayer well. To avoid jeopardizing their future careers, regulators adopt forbearance policies, imposing the resulting costs on the taxpayer.
Because of conflicts of interest among politicians, regulators, and taxpayers, economically insolvent institutions do not necessarily "fail."
For a failure decision to be made, regulators must decide that their normal attitude of forbearance is no longer in their bureaucratic interest.
The Model of Regulators' Decision-making
Economic theory can explain why deferring meaningful action can be the rational choice for federal officials. In economics, an agent's decision is modeled as the outcome of a constrained optimization problem, where the agent minimizes or maximizes an objective function subject to one or more constraints on his actions.
Kane adapts this optimization approach to develop a model of regulatory decision-making. The model incorporates incentive problems arising from distributional conflict, information asymmetry, externalities, and agency costs. As defined in Kane (1988) , distributional conflict is inherent in any government action that benefits one segment of society at the expense of others. Externalities are ' uncompensated costs or benefits imposed on a private party as a result of an action by another. Agency costs are welfare or resource losses arising from conflicts between the interests of taxpayers as principals and the narrower interests of government officials appointed to serve as their agents. The model developed recognizes political pressures generated by distributional conflict and externalities, as well as the incentive problems arising from information asymmetries and principal-agent conflicts.
In his model, Kane (1988 Kane ( , 1989 envisions two extreme types of regulators. The first type, unconflicted or faithful agents, protect the interests of taxpayers, resisting politician-imposed restraints and career-oriented incentives. In contrast, conflicted or self-interested agents are tempted by these incentives and serve their narrower interests rather than, or in addition to, those of the taxpayer.
In making a failure decision for individual institutions, a value-maximizing or faithful agent compares the economic costs (implicit plus explicit) of allowing the institution to fail with those of allowing it to operate. At each period, the difference between these costs, which may be interpreted as the net cost of waiting, determines the failure When an institution is closed, the value of its insurance guarantees may become an immediate claim against its insurance agency. The market value (MV) of a firm's capital is equal to the market value of its enterprise-contributed capital--its net value (MI)--plus the market value of its insurance guarantees (federally contributed capital). Federal guarantees provide credit enhancements that allow an institution to finance its operations at lower costs or with less enterprise-contributed equity.
The market value of deposit insurance guarantees can be defined as the incremental value these guarantees add to the market value of a financial institution's enterprise-contributed equity. The relationship is clarified in figure 1 . For a well-capitalized institution, federal guarantees do not provide a significant level of credit enhancement. However, they are crucial for institutions with low or negative NV, especially after the institution becomes economically insolvent (NV-0).
This hyperbolic relationship between MV and NV is approximated by the following function:
This approximation is adopted because, in the limit, when NV takes on increasingly larger positive values, the incremental value of deposit insurance guarantees becomes increasingly less significant and MV approaches the 45-degree line (or NV). The function also satisfies the condition that for increasingly larger (in absolute terms) negative values of NV, the value of federal guarantees becomes increasingly crucial, offsetting the negative NV. Finally, in the limiting case, MV approaches the horizontal axis (zero).
Then the guarantee function is given by
As explained above, G(NV) is a claim against the insurance fund. If the institution is closed this period, with NV,, in addition to possible payouts, the insurance agency also incurs paperwork costs (Cp) of studying the institution's portfolio and negotiating a reprivatization.
If the institution is allowed to operate one more period, its NV becomes
where r is the rate of return and e is a shock with standard error u.
Theoretically, the mean value of e should depend on enterprisecontributed equity, portfolio riskiness, and regulatory closure rules.
However, if we assume this mean to be zero and use Taylor's theorem, the expected value of the future guarantee is given by
Monitoring costs, C , , are also incurred. In addition, depending on NV,, there is a probability that the institution will be closed next period if the shock is negative. Thus, there is also an expected paperwork cost, which can be assumed to be a fraction of C , depending on the expected probability of closure next period. The net cost of waiting is given by
.
The faithful agent makes a failure decision if K is positive, and allows the institution to operate if K is negative.
On the right-hand side of equation (5), the first three terms collectively give the one-period expected change in the guarantee value.
G(NV) is always positive, approaching zero or the absolute value of NV, as NV goes to positive or negative infinity, respectively. G1(NV) varies from 0 to -1 for the same range. GW(NV) is always positive and approaches zero as NV moves away from zero in either direction.
Because the third term is always positive, it drives the failure decision, particularly in the vicinity of NV-0, where the curvature is highest. The first term is always negative, and the second term is negative for positive NV, so that for high values of NV these terms plus Cp, combine to offset the diminishing effect of the third term, and prevent failure. As NV becomes very large, the first term drops out, and the second and third terms go to negative and positive infinity, respectively, offsetting each other's effect. Thus, as the institution obtains more and more of its own capital, the cost of waiting becomes zero or negative (depending on the net monitoring minus paperwork costs), and the agent does not make a failure decision.
For negative MI, the second term is positive and encourages failure.
However, the first term is always negative and greater in absolute value (since G > NV and 0 > G' > -I), so the combined effect of the first two terms is negative. As NV becomes more and more negative, however, the combined effect of the first two terms goes to zero. Thus, the overall effect of the three terms is dominated by the third term, which approaches positive infinity. Therefore, the more negative NV becomes, the costlier it is to wait.
In economic terms, the model indicates that if the guarantee value is expected to increase, the cost of waiting also increases. This is expected, since an increase in guarantee value leads to an increase in the claim against the insurance agency. Also, monitoring costs encourage a failure decision, whereas paperwork costs discourage it. A trade-off between the two costs clearly exists. However, if the faithful agent is able to resist economic constraints effectively, the relative contributior of monitoring and paperwork costs to the failure decision may be negligible. Theoretically, other variables do not affect the decision-making of faithful agents, but since the risk-taking incentives of low NV institutions are not modeled above, empirically NV may also enter directly.
For a conflicted agent, additional factors affect the failure decision. The aforementioned political and bureaucratic constraints and career-oriented incentives make it more costly for the agent to make a failure decision. These effects are denoted by C,, which represents the career costs. For a conflicted agent, the cost of waiting is given by
The career cost of making a failure decision is greater, the greater the extent of conflicts between politicians and regulators and regulators and taxpayers. The net cost of waiting decreases as the conflicting incentive systems and constraints increase the career cost. The more conflicted the agent, the greater the C,. It is not difficult to visualize an extreme case where the career cost becomes so high that it far outweighs the other factors and dominates the K(NV) function. This implies a zero or negative K(NV). In these circumstances, regardless of the institution's market-value insolvency, a failure decision will not be made. Assume the following stochastic regulator cost function:
The functions a(X1) and ~(3) are stochastic counterparts of the theoretical cost functions of failing the institution and allowing it to operate, respectively. The nonstochastic portions of these expressions can be modeled as functions of variable vectors, X, and 3 . Any unobservable random influences are captured by the stochastic error components e, and e,.
Value maximization requires a failure decision to be made only if the cost of failing the institution is less than allowing the institution to operate, and vice versa:
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Now we can identify Fk with our theoretical criterion variable, the net cost of waiting.
Est.
A failure decision is made if this cost is greater than zero, and the institution is allowed to operate autonomously if it is not:
Placed in a regression framework, this threshold argument may be expressed as Fk = Xg + V, where X1 ,3 c X and v = ec-e,.
Then,
where F is the cumulative distribution function of the e,-e,. The type of probability model obtained depends on the choice of this distribution function.
Thus, the failure equation models an optimization by the regulators.
Constraints and incentives gain importance to the extent that the agent is conflicted. The exogenous variables, X, are specified in the theoretical model, (6) . In practice, NV, G(NV), G'(NV), and GW(NV) can only be estimated (measured with error), and the costs C,, Cpwl and C, are unobserved, Therefore, potential regressors include estimated NV and expected change in the guarantee value (AGV) and regulatory constraint and incentive proxies.
One variable that ought to affect the regulatorsl.failure decision is the market value of enterprise-contributed equity. This net equity value summarizes the bank's true financial condition. Naturally, a faithful ' agent's failure deckion is highly influenced by this value. However, this may not be true for a conflicted agent. To investigate whether the agent's perception of the economic insolvency of an institution is based on market values or on an accounting distortion of the market-value solvency, the book value of the institution's equity is also considered.
The full model consists of three equations. The first models the determinants of the institution's capital. The second obtains the estimate of the market value of enterprise-contributed (net) equity, which in our case is stockholder-contributed equity, since the institutions considered in this study are stockholder-owned as opposed to mutually owned. Net economic value is constructed by subtracting the estimated value of the guarantee from the estimated market value of the institution's capital. Finally, the third equation estimates the probability of a failure decision by the regulators. In symbols: AGVi,, = the one-period change in the guarantee value of the ith institution as expected by the regulators at time t.
Xi, -vector of proxy variables for C , , Cw, and C,, as explained below.
The first two equations of the model estimate the enterprisecontributed equity or net value (NV). I estimate the value of the guarantee within a regression-equation statistical market value accounting model (SMVAM) introduced by Kane and Unal (1990) . The SMVAM studies the determinants of the market value of an institution's equity. A nonlinear version of the model is also developed. Once an estimate of the guarantee value is obtained, it is possible to construct net equity-by subtracting the estimated guarantee value from the market value of the institution's equity .
Because the emphasis of t h i s paper is on modeling regulators' f a i l u r e decisions, the reader i s referred t o Demirgiic-Kunt (1990a , 1990b f o r a detailed derivation and estimation of the f i r s t two equations. The f a i l u r e equation employs an estimate of NV given by t h e f i r s t two equations of the model, and AGV i s obtained from equations (2), ( 3 ) , and (4) above.
The f a i l u r e equation is the empirical version of t h e t h e o r e t i c a l failure-decision model developed above. The model predicts t h a t an increase i n AGV increases K, the cost of waiting, therefore making a f a i l u r e decision more l i k e l y . Thus, i n the empirical model, a p o s i t i v e coefficient i s expected f o r AGV, indicating a greater probability of making a f a i l u r e decision with an increase i n AGV.
Choice of Proxy Variables Equation (6) t e l l s us t h a t theoretically Cm increases and C , ,
and C, decrease the c o s t of waiting. Thus, empirically Cm is expected t o have a positive c o e f f i c i e n t , whereas C , , and C, a r e expected t o have negative c o e f f i c i e n t s , making a f a i l u r e decision more and l e s s l i k e l y , respectively. One problem is t h a t , since n e i t h e r of these variables is observed, proxies must be used. Any residual e f f e c t t h a t cannot be captured by t h e proxies r e f l e c t s i n the i n t e r c e p t . I f the various costs a r e orthogonal t o the proxies employed, t h e intercept may be interpreted as the monitoring cost net of paperwork and career costs. I f the l a t t e r two costs outweigh the monitoring c o s t , the intercept w i l l have a negative sign.
The asset size (A) variable proxies both Cp and C,. Clearly, the larger the institution, both financially and administratively, the more difficult it becomes to resolve its insolvency (Conover [1984] , Seidman [1986] ). The size of the institution is directly related to the amount of paperwork costs incurred in the event of its failure. Also, institution size is expected to capture the economic, political, and bureaucratic constraints that increase regulators' career costs. The number of problem banks (PB), the bank failure rate (BFI), the general failure rate (FI), and the variance of interest rates (VAR)
are also included as political and bureaucratic constraint proxies that increase the career costs of making a failure decision. Theoretically, if these proxies could capture only the effects of political and bureaucratic constraints, we would expect them to have negative signs, since higher C, lowers the cost of waiting and leads to a lower probability of failure. Unfortunately, this may not be the case, since these variables may capture several counteracting effects. has a state charter. In both cases, the failure decision is usually made following the recommendation of the insurance agency.
The empirical model of large-bank failures developed in this paper is based on a theoretical regulatory failure decision-making model.
Hypothetically, a faithful agent's decision-making is unaffected by C,.
However, although most of the proxy variables are included to proxy for C,, it is difficult to distinguish empirically between the effect of C, and that of other costs, C , and Cp, on the failure decision.
This study does not claim to measure the extent of "faithfulness" of the agents. However, to the extent that faithful agents can resist economic constraints, we can assume empirically that their decision is mostly determined by NV and AGV--the economic insolvency of the institution. In contrast, a completely self-interested agent's failure decision is dominated by C,--the regulatory constraint and incentive proxies. The failure equation is estimated by the logit maximum likelihood method using cross-sectional and time-series pooled data. Generally, in estimation of binary qualitative response models, the choice between a logit or a probit model is not important (Amemiya [1981] ). When separate samples are drawn from different groups with unequal sampling rates, the www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm estimated coefficients of the probit model are biased, although this problem does not arise with the logit model (Maddala [1983] ). This is also true in our case, since all failed banks with traded stock are included in the failed category;but only a sample of the nonfailed banks is included in the nonfailed category.
The equation is estimated using NV obtained from linear and nonlinear versions of the insolvency equation (Demirgiic-Kunt [1990a . This covariance matrix is calculated using Amemiya's (1979) method. Even with the corrected asymptotic standard errors, conventional tests may err in the direction of nonsignificance in the case of qualitative response models (Maddala [1986] ). Therefore, as Maddala recommends, the significance of variables is determined using likelihood-ratio tests.
The results of the failure equation are presented in table 3. The preferred specifications of the linear and nonlinear versions retain nine and five exogenous variables, respectively.
The constant term is negative and significant for both versions. If career-cost proxies are orthogonal to monitoring and paperwork costs, this intercept may be interpreted following equation (6) as the monitoring costs net of paperwork costs. The negative sign indicates that the paperwork costs outweigh monitoring costs.
The expected change in guarantee value has a positive coefficient in both cases, although it proves significant only in the nonlinear version.
This result is consistent with the prediction of the failure-decision model developed in section 111. An increase in the expected guarantee value increases the cost of waiting, therefore making a failure decision more likely. This occurs since the guarantee value is a potential claim against the insurance agency, and an expected increase in this claim increases the probability that regulators will make a failure decision.
The coefficient of NV is negative and significant in both versions.
Clearly, an increase in the net economic value of an institution reduces the regulatory pressure to fail it. BV, when included without the NV, also has a negative and significant coefficient. However, when it is included with NV, its coefficient loses significance. This indicates that NV carries superior information about the institution's enterprise-' contributed equity and that no relevant additional information is contained in BV. Specifications including only BV are also inferior based on the above criteria.
These results indicate that bank-specific variables have the intuitively expected effects on regulatory decision-making. Thus, controlling for the institutions' solvency or insolvency, the variables A, BFI, FI, PB, VAR, EX, and R are career-cost proxies included to capture regulators' economic, political, and bureaucratic constraints and incentives.
The coefficient of asset size, A, is negative and significant in both cases. As a proxy for economic constraints, these results are expected.
Clearly, the larger the institution, the more binding the economic constraints and the more difficulty in dealing with its insolvency, both financially and administratively (Conover [1984] , Seidman [1986] ). It is also possible to interpret this result as evidence of binding political and bureaucratic constraints. The significantly negative coefficient of the size variable confirms the widely held hypothesis that failure decisions are less likely for larger institutions (Kaufman [1985] ).
BFI is negative in both versions but proves significant only in nonlinear specification. FI has a negative (yet insignificant) coefficient in the linear version and does not enter the nonlinear specification. These negative coefficients are consistent with the decision-making process of a conflicted regulator.
PB and VAR are also expected to capture the insolvency-toleration effect. However, these variables do not enter the nonlinear specification. In the linear specification, the significance of their contribution cannot be rejected (using likelihood-ratio tests). EX and R are included to capture, at least partially, the economic constraints faced by regulators. An increase in these variables lessens the possibility of conflict between politicians and regulators, thus lowering the career costs of making failure decisions.
EX has a significant and positive coefficient in both specifications.
An increase in the number of examiners raises the probability of a failure decision by relaxing the economic constraints on finding hidden insolvencies and therefore lowers the career costs of making a failure decision. For given levels of skill and client population, the greater the number of examiners employed at time t-1, the more frequent and thorough the examinations should be. This increases the probability that the FDIC will discover insolvent institutions, making a failure decision more likely at time t. 
A Holdout Test
The prediction accuracy discussed above is the in-sample prediction accuracy of the models, where the estimated model is used to reclassify the observations in the sample. This classification accuracy is useful in choosing among competing models because it is a determinant of statistical fit (Maddala [1986] The model of bank failure developed in this paper is more complete than earlier ones in that it acknowledges and incorporates the regulatory aspect of failure process. The explanatory and discriminatory power of the model supports the approach taken in this study. 
